Reassessing the Demography Hypothesis: the Great Brazilian Crime Shift

Mimicking the US in 1980 and 1990s, Brazil is a remarkable case of a major shift in homicides. After increasing steadily throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, homicides reached a peak in 2003, and then fell. I show a strong time-series co-movement between homicide rates and the percentage of the population in 15-24 age bracket. Using a panel of states, I find a very high elasticity of homicide with respect to changes in the 15-24 year-old population (2.4), after controlling for income, income inequality, and state and year fixed effects. I then focus on the case of São Paulo, the largest state in the country, and whose shift in homicides has been particularly acute. City-level panel elasticities are similar to the state-level estimates. Furthermore, the demographic shift in São Paulo was more pronounced than the national one, explaining the particularly large shift in homicides in São Paulo. The large cohort born from the mid 1970 through the early 1980 is the result of a sharp reduction in infant mortality only belatedly followed by acceleration in the reduction of fertility. In line with the Easterlin Hypothesis (Easterlin [1980]), this large cohort faced tough economic conditions. Educational attainment ceased to improve for this cohort, and unemployment rates upon entering the job market were exceptionally high. Thus, the large homicide shift in Brazil is produced by a particularly large and socially fragile cohort.Age Structure, Demographic Change, Homicides

A relational theory of relationship lending under contractual incompleteness

While the literature has focused on relationships as a technology for solving hidden information problems in credit markets, hidden action has been very little explored as an explanation for the existence of relational lending. In this paper, we propose a theory in which relationships are driven by the problem of contractual incompleteness in instances in which a borrower, by taking ex-ante actions, magnifies the hazards related to ex-post bargaining over returns. A relationship commits the borrower to take actions that minimize the ex-post conflict of interests resulting from contractual incompleteness. We show that a robust feature of an optimally designed lending relationship (i.e., the best Public Perfect Pure Strategy Equilibrium in a repeated lending game) is that a sufficiently patient entrepreneur, upon choosing his actions, ignores his privately observed contingencies. This commitment solves the credit rationing problem that arises in a one-shot (arm’s length) interaction, and reduces, when compared to arm’s length financing, the interest rate that a bank charges for a credit line. Although in a less acute fashion, we also show that the same features just described appear in an optimal lending relationship for the case in which the entrepreneur is impatient.

Does crime affect economic decisions? An empirical investigation of savings in a high-crime environment

While most economic studies of crime have focused on its determinants, we study the reverse question: does crime affect economic behavior? Being such an important social phenomenon, one would expect crime to affect economic decisions. Using local data on crime rates and savings per capita in a high-crime environment, we document a striking empirical relationship: crime induces savings. Our paper is one of the first to successfully relate crime to an economic outcome. This result is robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis, which include: 1) controlling to a large set of demographic covariates; 2) accounting for the fact that crime and savings may be determined jointly; 3) measuring savings in different ways; 4) accounting for the presence of possible outliers; 5) weighting the data according to population; 6) accounting for spatial correlation; and, finally, 7) estimating the model for different sub-samples of cities. Our estimates indicate that only property, not violent, crime induces savings, which is consistent with the theoretical explanations on why crime would increase thriftinessCrime, Economic Behavior, Savings

Relationship lending: Is it Incentives or hidden information?

Relationships are a valuable technology to produce loans. (Berger and Udell [1995], Petersen and Rajan [1994], Aoki and Dinç [2002]). While there are convincing theories in which relationships solve hidden action or hidden information problems, there is very little empirical corroboration of either theory. In this paper, we assess the empirically validity of these theories in the small firm credit market. While results suggest that relationships are more valuable for firms with worse incentive misaligment problems, more informationally opaque firms do not seem to extract more value from relationships. Contrary to what most empirical research on the value of relationships has assumed (but not tested), this indicates that relationships are, at very least, as important for aligning incentives as they are for solving hidden information problems.

Age Structure Explaining a Large Shift in Homicides: The Case of the State of São Paulo

After reaching a historic peak by the end of the 1990s, homicides in large cities in the state of São Paulo dropped sharply. Several explanations have been advanced, most prominently improvements in policing, adoption of policies such as dry laws, and increased incarceration. In this paper, we show that demographic changes play a large role in explaining the dynamics of homicide. More specifically, we present evidence of a strong co-movement between the proportion of males on the 15-25 age bracket and homicides at the statewide and at city levels, and argue that the relationship is causal. We estimate that a 1% increase in the proportion of 15-to-24-year-old males causes a 4.5% increase in homicides.Age Structure, Demographic Change, Homicides

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending : regression discontinuity evidence from Brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.Electoral Systems; Strategic Voting; Political Competition; Regression Discontinuity; Fiscal Spending. JEL Codes: H72; D72; C14; P1

Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-Natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil

Whether campaign advertising influences election outcomes is an open question; a paradox given the amount spent on campaigning in general and TV advertising in particular. We argue that such “absence of documentation” is due to the focus of the empirical literature on the United States, in which the allocation of campaign spending and advertising is decentralized. We explore a quasinatural experiment that enables us to mitigate the omitted variables and reverse causality problems caused by decentralized allocation. In Brazil, gubernatorial elections work in a two-round system. In the first round, candidates’ TV time shares are determined by their coalitions’ share of seats in the National Parliament. In the second round, TV time is split equally between the first-round winner and runner-up. Using differences between rounds as a source of variation, we find a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes.TV Advertising; Campaign Spending; Election Outcomes; Endogeneity; Quasi-Natural Experiments

Bye, Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Deepening: The Anatomy of a Financial Boom

Since the conquest of hyperinflation, with the Real Plan, in 1994, the Brazilian financial system has grown from early infancy to late adolescence. We describe the process of maturing with emphasis on the defining features of the Brazilian financial system over the last 20 years: 1) stabilization and the subsequent financial crisis; 2) universality of banks; 3) market segmentation through public lending; 4) institutional improvement. Further paraphrasing Díaz Alejandro (1984), we raise some hypotheses on why, this time, the financial boom has not (at least yet) turned into a financial crash.Financial repression; financial deepening; stabilization; stability; financial crisis;stability. Jel Codes: G21; G28; G32

Há assimetria no repasse dos juros bancários de variações na taxa Selic?

This paper tests and find evidence that support the view that credit interest rates respond more to increases than to decreases in the Central Bank basic interest rate (Selic). This asymmetry is robust to an event analysis, in which the availability of a dataset containing daily information is explored in order to isolate monetary policy shocks on interest rates as the cause of the assymetric response of interest rates, as a shift in the basic interest rate is akin to an increase in marginal cost and thus corresponds to a shift in the supply curve of banks. The econometric identification hypothesis is that banks (supply) react faster to monetary shocks than consumers (demand for credit). The empirical evidence of greater rigidity to Selic decreases contributes to the literature of bank behavior in credit markets and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Brazil.Microeconomics of Banking, interest pass-through and Adverse Selection JEL Codes: L11, G21

The Brazilian Payroll Lending Experiment

In 2004, Brazil provided an interesting natural experiment concerning personal credit. A new law was enacted allowing banks to offer loans with repayment through automatic payroll or social security benefit deduction, thus removing a significant part of the moral hazard problem by eliminating the choice of default when debtors are able to pay their loans out of their wages. We estimate the impact of the new law using car loans as a control group. We find that, at the industry level, the new law has caused a reduction in interest rates and an increase in the volume of personal credit.Credit markets, collateral, difference-in-differences. JEL Code: G21; D01; C33; K00; E44.